Heideggerian World Disclosure Through the Proboscis of a 1/2 cc 28g Syringe

In Heideggerian parlance, world disclosure is the basic relation of aesthetic text into shapeable, transformative wholes - in a word, the "stuff" of our interpretation; such an event is a necessary investigation of the ontological, which, for Heidegger, is not merely a passing instruction, but a mandatory return to the skeptical intercourse between Dasein and the external world. The profundity of being emptied into the world, of all mentionable things erupting like small star-fires and expressing considerations of reality, is responsible for Dasein's immediate task as an authentic being; that hideous "geworfenheit,"  what Sartre would later describe as a mortal condemnation, singly justifies, or at the bottom least entreats, Dasein's ontological curiosity. Heidegger's concept of the affective worldhome is wrought with nauseous possibility, suggesting an utterly nihilistic circumstance for Dasein as a being-out-there. The ontic relationship between the world and Dasein influences a battery of potential distractions by generating a causal web of phenomena from which issue all models of metamorphic experience.
The heedlessness of the early aesthetes, with particular favor to Hegel and the phenomenologists, was, for Heidegger, a trying wound to the large of ontology; in Being and Time he writes, "...if it is said that "Being" is the most universal concept, this cannot mean that it is the one which is clearest or that it needs no further discussion. It is rather the darkest of all."
The history of philosophy has invariably strayed in the outer territories of phenomenology with small regard to the importance of the facticity, or perhaps more appropriately, the design or structure of "Being."
Heidegger's ontology is, to borrow Bachelard's terminology, the glimpse of an "epistemological rupture" of  the intelligence, the shape, of phenomena. For Heidegger, we must shed the ontotheological sickness, that unique blemish on the skin of the West, and too the source of a rabid idleness that stalks the tread of our ontological situation. To triumph over a rotten metaphysics is to recreate the life-element part and parcel, willfully re-imagining the human creature as an authentic expression of itself - collating the insterstitial spaces between Dasein's  intellectual habitat and the phenomenological chaos of the outer world, where the sense of being "at-home" is harshly confronted; the agoraphobic nature of Heideigger's ontology is a tragic waltz of the surreal - for Sartre, it meant a Dionysian romance of the life-dread, the true anxiety of the human being, with the flippancy of  simply being "free." Here, then, Dasein is consigned to an intuitive "being-there" - a hypostatized experience as of wagging in the abyss.